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MANUFACTURER'S LIABILITY FOR REDHIBITORY VICES
The intricacies of the implied warranty for hidden defects were
brought before the courts again in Breaux v. Winnebago Industries,
Inc. I Plaintiff bought a mobile home from one of the defendants.
After having his endurance tested through considerable frustration
and inconvenience, the result of a perversely persistent malfunction-
ing of the vehicle that the skill of several mechanics was unable to
overcome, plaintiff instituted action against the dealer from whom he
acquired the vehicle and against the manufacturer, with whom he
had no direct contractual relation, seeking rescission and damages for
redhibitory defects. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of
both defendants. On plaintiff's appeal, the First Circuit Court of
Appeal reversed. The manufacturer, Winnebago Industries, Inc., had
raised an exception of no cause of action based on the absence of a
seller-purchaser relationship with the plaintiff, asserting, further,
that such contractual relationship is essential for the purchaser to
have an action for rescission or quanti minoris based on redhibitory
defects.2 The court of appeal disposed of the exception in favor of the
plaintiff on the authority of the views expressed by the Louisiana
supreme court in Media Production Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-
Benz of North America, Inc.3 In that case, the supreme court held a
national distributor, classified as a manufacturer, solidarily liable
with an automobile retailer for the price and other allowable expenses
because of the redhibitory vices in a vehicle.
Both the supreme court and the court of appeal deserve praise;
the latter for a fair decision, the former for having furnished the
grounds in a prior one. Because of the connection between the cases,
however, both decisions leave some uncertainty as to the true theory
on which they were predicated.'
Indeed, in Media, the supreme court asserted that a manufac-
turer impliedly warrants that its product is free from redhibitory
vices and defects, and that there is no necessity of privity of contract
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 282 So. 2d 763 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
2. Id. at 767.
3. 262 La. 80, 262 So. 2d 377 (1972).
4. See Note, 33 LA. L. REV. 724 (1973); Note, 47 TUL. L. REV. 473 (1973). See also
Babst, Redhibition and Tort! Are They Enough? 22 LA. B. J. 19 (1974); Campbell, The
Remedy of Redhibition: A Cause Gone Wrong, Id. at 27.
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for a purchaser to bring an action of rescission against the manufac-
turer. In the words of the majority: "Louisiana has aligned itself with
the consumer-protection rule, by allowing a consumer without privity
to recover, whether the suit be strictly in tort or upon implied war-
ranty." 5 After supporting this view with two of its earlier decisions
where the facts differed from the Media situation,6 the court added:
"The pecuniary loss resulting from an unusable vehicle is recoverable
when there is an express warranty without privity . . . . Although
there is a split of authority on the question, we find no adequate
reason for not applying the same rule and allowing recovery when
there is an implied warranty without privity."7 For that statement,
the court found support in decisions rendered in other states.' It
seems from the quoted language that the Media, and therefore the
Breaux, decisions have adopted the views currently prevailing at
common law in the matter of product liability. Although the theoreti-
cal grounds for those views are not yet clear, there is good reason to
believe that the main orientation is towards strict tort liability., A
footnote to a paragraph of the majority opinion in Media, however,
and the approach taken in the concurring opinion in the same case
leave room for doubt that strict tort liability theory is what the court
intended as grounds for decision."0 That theory is not the best instru-
ment to obtain the dissolution of a contract of sale attended by return
of the defective thing, recovery of the price, and damages incidental
to a vendor's breach of his obligation to deliver a suitable thing."
5. 262 La. 80, 90, 262 So. 2d 377, 381 (1972).
6. See Marine Ins. Co. v. Strecker, 234 La. 522, 100 So. 2d 493 (1958), where, on
the strength of article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code, a tenant was granted recovery
against a party who contracted with his landlord, for damage to the tenant's property,
and LeBlanc v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 221 La. 919, 60 So. 2d 873 (1952),
the celebrated case where plaintiff recovered against the manufacturer for personal
injuries caused by an extraneous substance found in a soft drink bottle, a recovery
certainly not grounded by the court on any contractual warranty. See particularly id.
at 932, 60 So. 2d at 877 (Hawthorne, J., dissenting).
7. 262 La. 80, 91, 262 So. 2d 377, 381 (1972).
8. Id.
9. See Note, 47 TuL. L. REV. 473, 479 (1973).
10. Media Prod. Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., 262
La. 80, 89 n.3, 262 So. 2d 377, 381 n.3 (1972): "Under French law, the right to sue the
original vendor for breach of warranty of quality is transmitted with the object of the
sale." (Citations omitted.); Id. at 92, 262 So. 2d at 382 (Dixon, J., concurring).
11. Whether product liability is governed by tort or contract is certainly not a
matter of mere academic importance. Very serious problems involving jurisdiction,
prescription, conflict of laws and other matters depend on a final choice of theory. See
Percy, Products Liability-Tort or Contract or What? 40 TUL. L. REv. 715, 726 (1966);
Note, 47 TUL. L. REV. 473, 479 (1973). Regardless of these reasons, it cannot be denied
that the weight of the circumstances involved in factual situations has a force of its
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The same results as in Media and Breaux can be attained
through remedies provided in the Louisiana Civil Code. This sugges-
tion leads to the certainly not novel question of whether a purchaser,
disappointed by a defective thing, may sue his vendor's vendor, or
any other party in the chain of transferors of the thing ending with
with the original manufacturer."2 The advantages of such an action
for the purchaser are well known. If his vendor has fallen into insol-
vency, which is precisely what happened in Media, the purchaser can
still sue another solvent party. Moreover, if his vendor was in good
faith, that is, if he was ignorant of the vices of the thing he sold, and
he failed to repair it, the purchaser may recover from him only the
price and the expenses of the sale, while the manufacturer, because
of spondet peritiam artis, is presumed to have known the defects of
the thing of his own making. This casts him in the position of a
vendor in bad faith and he is therefore liable also for damages. 3
The question put must be answered in the affirmative. Support
for this conclusion can be found in the doctrine surrounding the war-
ranty against eviction, sister of the warranty against redhibitory
vices.'4 In the matter of eviction, article 2503 of the Louisiana Civil
Code provides: "But whether warranty be excluded or not the buyer
shall become subrogated to the seller's rights and actions in warranty
own. A case involving a soft drink bottle or a can of peas, purchased for a few coins,
and extensive personal injuries caused to the purchaser by such things, may sound in
tort, while a case involving an expensive automobile where the purchaser is primarily
concerned with recovering the price he paid for a defective thing sounds in contract.
For a discussion of the choice of theory in modern French law, see Mazeaud, La
responsabilit civile du vendeur-fabricant, 53 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL 611
(1955) [hereinafter cited as Mazeaud].
12. See Morrow, Warranty of Quality: A Comparative Survey, 14 TuL. L. REv. 327
& 529 (1940) [hereinafter cited as Morrow]. See also Rabel, The Nature of Warranty
of Quality, 24 TUL. L. REV. 273 (1950).
13. For spondet peritiam artis, the Roman principle which expresses the presump-
tion that a manufacturer knows the defects of the things he makes, see 3 OE VREs DE
POTHER 88 (Bugnet ed. 1861). See also Mazeaud at 615; Morrow at 539; Radalec, Inc.
v. Automatic Firing Corp., 228 La. 116, 81 So. 2d 830 (1955); Tuminello v. Mawby,
220 La. 733, 57 So. 2d 666 (1952); George v. Shreveport Cotton Oil Co., 114 La. 498,
38 So. 432 (1905). LA. Civ. CODE art. 2531, as amended by La. Acts 1974. No. 673
provides: "The seller who knew not the vices of the thing is only bound to repair,
remedy or correct the vices . . . or if he be unable or fails to repair, remedy or correct
the vice, then he must restore the purchase price, and reimburse the reasonable expen-
ses occasioned by the sale, as well as those incurred for the preservations of the thing,
subject to credit for the. value of any fruits or use which the purchaser has drawn from
it." Id. art. 2545 provides: "The seller, who knows the vice of the thing he sells and
omits to declare it, besides the restitution of the price and repayment of the expenses,
is answerable to the buyer in damages." See also FRENCH CIv. CODE art. 1645.
14. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 2476; FRENCH Civ. CODE art. 1625.
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against all others." In case of eviction, then, there can be no doubt
that the purchaser has an action against his vendor's ancestor in title
through the notion of subrogation, as the article has it. The quoted
sentence of article 2503, however, was introduced by an amendment
in 1924.'1 Until then, and since the Digest of 1808, the article read as
did its French ancestor, article 1627 of the Code Napoleon, that is,
with no reference to the purchaser's action against his vendor's ven-
dor.'1 Despite the lack of an express code provision, however, neither
the French doctrine and jurisprudence nor the Louisiana jurispru-
dence prior to 1924 has ever doubted that such an action existed.'7
That certainty is warranted by a well established principle that
a traditional authority expresses in the following words: "Successive
contracts of sale, in transferring ownership of the thing also transfer,
from hand to hand and as accessories, all actions in warranty arising
from each sale which are finally reunited in the hands of the last
purchaser." 8 The principle, undoubtedly known to the Louisiana
redactors, is predicated of all actions in warranty and cannot there-
fore be limited to eviction alone. Indeed, under articles 2476 of the
Louisiana Civil Code and 1625 of the French, the vendor's obligation
of warranty is twofold: "The warranty respecting the seller has two
objects; the first is the buyer's peaceable possession of the thing sold,
and the second is the hidden defects of the thing sold or its redhibi-
tory vices." Thus, the evicted purchaser would have an action against
his vendor's vendor even without the 1924 amendment to article 2503.
By the same token, the purchaser has an action for redhibition
against his vendor's ancestors in the chain of transfers, even in the
absence of express code language to that effect.'"
It might be said that in French law the principle according to
15. See La. Acts 1924, No. 116. Research into the corresponding House and Senate
journals has failed to reveal the legislative motive for the amendment. But see Van-
norght v. Foreman, 1 Mart. (N.S.) 352 (La. 1823); Carpenter v. Herndon, 173 La. 239,
136 So. 577 (1931).
16. See 3 LOUISIANA LEAL ARCHIVES 1377-78 (1942).
17. See 5 AUBRY & RAu, COURS DE DRorr CIVIL FRANqAIS n ° 89 (5th ed. 1907)
[hereinafter cited as AUBRY & RAU]; 24 LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL FRANqAiS 230
(1877); 10 PLAINOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE Daorr CIVIL FRANqAIS 102-03 (1932)
[hereinafter cited as PLANIOL ET RIPERT]. See also Clark v. Warner, 6 La. Ann. 408
(1851).
18. 9 TOULUER, LE DRorr CIVIL FRANqAIS 121 (Duvergier ed. 1838) [hereinafter cited
as ToUIER].
19. See AUBRY & RAU 114; 17 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET SAIGNAT, TRAITIt THtORIQUE
ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL - DE LA VENTE ET DE L'ICHANGE 368-69 (2d ed. 1900); 10 Huc,
COMMENTAIRE THItORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DU CODE CIVIL 209 (1897); PLAINOL ET RIPERT 145-
46. See also Cass., Nov. 12, 1884, D. 85.1.357; Paris Feb. 24, 1882, D. 83.2.78; Bordeaux,
Jan. 11, 1888, D. 89.2.11.
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which a vendor transfers all actions as accessories to the thing is
consistent with article 1166 of the Code Napoleon: "The creditors,
however, may exercise all the rights and actions of their debtor, with
exception of those which are exclusively attached to the person." In
Louisiana, the absence of such an article might seem to raise an
obstacle to the application of the principle, but such an objection
would not rest on firm grounds. The French article was reproduced
in the Louisiana Digest in 1808.20 Though it was eliminated in the
revision of 1825, a comment by the redactors in the Project suffi-
ciently explains that their intention was to suppress a rule that they
considered obvious, without doing away with the underlying principle
they regarded in the comment as undoubtedly valid. 21
At any rate, this line of reasoning merely corroborates the Louis-
iana redactors' awareness of the existence of a certain rule. It should
not be taken to mean that the purchaser's right to address himself to
his vendor's vendor is based on that rule. Under article 1166 of the
Code Napoleon, the creditor's action against his debtor's debtor is
oblique, that is, the creditor is allowed to exercise an action that, in
actuality, belongs to his debtor. The action of the purchaser against
the party who transferred to his vendor is instead direct, that is, it is
an action he obtained from his vendor by means of a cession or assign-
ment implied in the sale. 2
That the purchaser is subrogated to the seller's rights to bring
20. See La. Digest of 1808, ch. III, sec. VI, art. 66.
21. See 1 LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES, PROJET OF THE CIVIL CODE OF 1825 at 263
(1937): "Suppress all the articles of section 6 and the title. This section consists only
of three articles, the first of which is already inserted in substance in the third section
of the preceding chapter. The two other contain provisions which are stated as excep-
tions to the rule contained in the first, but which, when examined, are found not to be
such. The rule is, that contracts neither avail nor injure any but the parties. The
exceptions stated, are, that creditors may enforce, for their own benefit, contracts
made by their debtors, and that they may also invalidate such contracts when they
have been made to defraud them. But when the creditor sues to recover a debt due to
his debtor, he does not do it as a party to the contract, still less is it in that quality
that he acts in endeavoring to set aside an agreement made to his prejudice."
(Emphasis added.) Compare with LA. Civ. CODE arts. 1990-92. See also A. YIANNOPOU-
LOS, PROPERTY in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 229 n.117 (1967); Belcher & Creswell
v. Johnson, 114 La. 640, 38 So. 481 (1905); Landry v. Hawkins, 156 So. 795 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1934). Article 1166 of the Code Napoleon, however, is mentioned in the text
above only for its consistency with the principle that the vendor transfers the thing to
the vendee cum omnis causa (with all actions) but not as a suggestion that the pur-
chaser's action against the ancestor in title of his vendor is necessarily founded in that
article. For further discussion of the matter see 10 PLAINOL ET RIPERT 102-03 TOULLIER
121.
22. See PLANIOL ET RIPERT 102-03. But see Cass. Com., Feb. 27, 1973, D. 1974.138
& note by Malinvaud criticizing the opposite view. See also TOULLIER 121.
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an action for redhibition had been recognized by the Louisiana
jurisprudence in McEachern v. Plauche Lumber & Construction Co. 23
In that case, however, the court implied that the purchaser has a
choice of actions and that once he has elected to sue his vendor he
has no right to an "action in solido" against previous vendors. 2' The
grounds for this contention are not clear. In France, under the same
rules, the jurisprudence did not hesitate to allow a purchaser to join
in his demand the vendor and a previous vendor, or the manufacturer
as the case might be.25 The decision rendered in Media departs en-
tirely from McEachern and establishes the correct idea of not forcing
the purchaser to make a choice. That the defendants in such a suit
should be cast in solido is consistent with a doctrine developed by the
Louisiana jurisprudence, a doctrine according to which parties who
owe the same performance, although each for a different cause, are
bound by an imperfect solidary bond."5
In the matter of solidarity, however, the decision in Media left
room for some doubt. Indeed, under the facts in that case, there was
no difficulty in holding vendor and distributor liable in solido, as
plaintiff was seeking only recovery of the price and expenses resulting
from the sale. A question remained, however, as to the right solution
when the purchaser also seeks damages. In such a case, only the
manufacturer, or distributor, or whoever is placed in the position of
a vendor in bad faith is liable for such damages, but not the vendor
in good faith. 7 Such a difference in the position of two defendants
would prevent casting them in solido. While the Breaux decision was
not directly addressed to this matter, it aptly dispelled any doubt by
correct interpretation and application of the rule established in
Media. The court held vendor and manufacturer solidarily liable for
the price and expenses incurred for the preservation of the thing, and
also held the manufacturer singularly liable for damages not recover-
able against the vendor.2"
23. 220 La. 696, 57 So. 2d 405 (1952).
24. Id. at 707, 57 So. 2d at 408.
25. See Cass. Nov. 12, 1884, D. 85.1.357. See also Paris, Feb. 24, 1882, D. 83.2.78;
Bordeaux, Jan. 11, 1888, D. 89.2.11.
26. See, e.g., Gay & Co. v. Blanchard, 32 La. Ann. 497 (1880); The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973 Term - Obligations, 34 LA. L. REV. 231
(1974). The matter of solidarity greatly depends on whether the purchaser's action
against his vendor's vendor is oblique or direct; if oblique, no solidary bond would exist
between a vendor and his ancestors in title vis-a-vis the purchaser. See on this 4 AUaty
& RAu, DROIT CIVIL FRANqAIS § 298 b (6th ed. Bartin) in 1 CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS at
24 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1965).
27. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2531, 2545.
28. Breaux v. Winnebago Industries, Inc., 282 So. 2d 763, 770 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1973).
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In Media, the court placed a national distributor in the position
of a manufacturer insofar as spondet peritiam artis is concerned. As
asserted in Media: "By placing automobiles on the market, the sup-
plier represents to the public that the vehicles are suitable for use."29
Such a view may well be taken as a step in the direction of applying
spondet pertiam artis not only to manufacturers but also to profes-
sional vendors. Traditional and modern doctrine lend sufficient sup-
port for an extensive application of the adage.3" If clearly adopted,
this manner of handling the presumption of knowledge of defects in
the thing sold would allow the same fair results as in Media, but
without need of straining concepts. Furthermore, the interests that
products liability tends to protect would be much better protected by
holding professional vendors in the same position as manufacturers.
These reflections on the Media and Breaux cases are applicable
also to Clark v. McBride Dodge, Inc.3 and Baughman v. Quality
Mobil Homes, Inc.3"
CERTAIN VERSUS ALEATORY CONTRACTS
An interesting problem related to the matter of classification of
contracts is involved in Cryer v. M & M Manufacturing Co.3" Defen-
dant acquired from plaintiff the right to manufacture an outdoor
heater for an agreed price of $12,500 in cash plus a royality of $1.35
for each unit manufactured. Defendant further agreed to manufac-
ture a minimum of 5000 units in the first year. No express warranty
as to the capacity of the heater or its suitability for orchard-heating
purposes was contained in the sale. After producing a small number
of units, defendant discovered that the heater failed to generate suffi-
cient heat to protect vegetation. Extensive unsuccessful efforts were
made to correct this deficiency and finally, considering the heaters
unmarketable, defendant abandoned its plans to manufacture them.
At the end of the first year, plaintiff brought suit for royalties and
attorneys' fees under the contract. Defendant reconvened for rescis-
sion of the sale on grounds of error, failure of cause and redhibitory
vice. The reconventional demand was dismissed and plaintiff was
granted recovery for royalties on 5000 heaters that were never manu-
factured.
29. 262 La. 80, 91, 262 So. 2d 377, 381 (1972).
30. See 3 OEuvRES DE POTHIER 88 (Bugnet ed. 1861) where knowledge of the de-
fects is presumed not only of the artisan who has made the thing but also of the
merchant who has made a profession of selling things of that sort. See also Mazeaud
at 616-17.
31. 289 So. 2d 841 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
32. 289 So. 2d 376 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
33. 273 So. 2d 818 (La. 1972), aff'd on rehearing, 273 So. 2d 828 (La. 1973).
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The decision stands on firm grounds regarding the dismissal of
the allegations of error, failure of cause and redhibitory vice and the
upholding of the sale, with the attendant consequence that plaintiff
could keep the price he received in cash. It is different insofar as the
royalties were concerned. Indeed, holding the defendant to pay royal-
ties for heaters that were not manufactured amounts to a finding that
defendant assumed an unconditional obligation to manufacture such
heaters regardless of usefulness or marketability. A closer look at the
contract reveals that such a finding is not correct. In purchasing the
right to manufacture the heaters, defendant no doubt assumed the
risk of the transaction in the sense that producing the heaters might
or might not have been possible, useful or profitable. It does not
follow that defendant assumed the obligation to pay royalties even if
production of the heaters was not possible, useful or profitable.
Regarding the purchase of manufacturing rights for a price in
cash, the contract is "certain" according to the terminology of article
1776 of the Louisiana Civil Code, while regarding the obligation to
pay royalties, the contract is aleatory, under the same article." It is
not disputed that a contract may fall under more than one category.
It does not have to be aleatory in whole; it may be so only in part.35
French jurisprudence asserts that courts are sovereign in determining
the aleatory nature of a contact, and also in determining whether a
contract is of a mixed nature, that is, part synallagmatic and part
aleatory. 6
In this case, the existence of an implied condition, namely, the
heater's susceptibility to useful manufacture, makes the contract
aleatory. Quite often, the parties clearly intend to make the effects
34. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1776: "A contract is aleatory or hazardous, when the per-
formance of that which is one of its objects, depends on an uncertain event. It is
certain, when the thing to be done is supposed to depend on the will of the party, or
when in the usual course of events it must happen in the manner stipulated." See 1
S. LrrvINOFF, OBLIGATIONS in 6 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 191-93, 406 (1969). The
court recognizes that the contract was speculative in some degree. Cryer v. M & M
Mfg. Co., 273 So. 2d 818, 824 (La. 1972). A contract, however, may be speculative and
still be "certain." Speculative contracts and aleatory contracts are different things. A
contract is speculative when there is a conjecture about the lesser or greater value of
the contractual object. From this standpoint there is always some degree of speculation
in a business contract. A contract is aleatory when, according to the "alea," one of the
two parties may not have to perform, or may be bound to perform in a lesser or greater
extent.
35. See KAHN, LA NOTION DE L'ALEA DANS LES CONTRACTS § 74 (1925); 6 PLANIOL ET
RIPERT, TRAIT9 PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRAN(qAIS 43 (2d ed. Esmein 1952).
36. See Req., Dec. 28, 1874, D. 76.1.368; July 10, 1899, D. 99.1.592; Civ., April 19,
1882, D. 83.1.77, S. 82.1.368.
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of their transaction dependent on a certain fact, but do not make an
express condition of it simply because they regard it as something
assumed or understood."7 Such a fact cannot be ignored without ig-
noring the parties' own wishes and interests. It is not too daring,
therefore, to consider an implied condition of this sort as the founda-
tion on which the transaction rests, that is, an essential though unex-
pressed element, the removal or disappearance of which gives rise to
the right to have the transaction dissolved. 8 Article 2026 of the Louis-
iana Civil Code lends support to this line of reasoning." Additional
support is provided by articles 1901 and 1903."o
37. See OERTMANN, INTRODUccION AL DERECHO CIVIL 305 (Spanish transl. 1933).
38. Id. For a comparative analysis of the common law doctrine of "constructive
conditions" and equivalent civilian notions see 2 Ping BRUTAU, FUNDAMENTO DE
DERECHO CIVIL DOCTRINA GENERAL DEL CONTRATO 389-90 (1954).
39. LA. CIv. CODE art, 2026: "Conditions are either express or implied. They are
express, when they appear in the contract; they are implied, whenever they result from
the operation of the law, from the nature of the contract, or from the presumed intent
of the parties." (Emphasis added.) See Cryer v. M & M Mfg. Co., 273 So. 2d 818, 826
(La. 1972) (Tate, J., dissenting).
40. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1901: "Agreements legally entered.., must be performed
in good faith." Id. 1903: "The obligation of contracts extends not only to what is
expressly stipulated, but also to everything that, by law, equity or custom, is consid-
ered as incidental to the particular contract, or necessary to carry it into effect." See
6 DEMOGUE, TRAITIt DES OBLIGATIONS EN GENERAL 1-30 (1931). This prominent French
authority asserts that a party breaches the duty of good faith when he attempts to
abuse his right to the detriment of the other party. To force a party to manufacture
an unmarketable heater amounts, no doubt, to abuse of right.
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